"Unregulation" and Broadcast Financing:
New Ways for the Federal Communications
Commission To Serve the Public Interest
Nancy R. Selbstt
Sixty-four years ago, Congress set out to regulate the broadcasting industry. The Radio Act of 1927,1 and its successor, the
Federal Communications Act of 1934,2 created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Congress charged the FCC with
regulating in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 3 The
FCC, in turn, created specific regulations as well as more general
policies to carry out its legislative mandate. Over the next few decades, it controlled ownership licenses and broadcast finance, restricted multiple ownership, oversaw station operations, issued
guidelines for commercial and non-entertainment programming,
and regulated in a host of other ways.
One such general policy governs the overlap of FCC policies
with state and federal laws. The FCC accommodates other such
laws when doing so does not conflict with the Communications Act;
it has also altered many of its policies to make its regulations consistent with state and federal laws.
While this policy of accommodation has stayed constant over
time, many other policies changed in the early 1980's, as the FCC
began to see its role in a new light. In 1981, President Reagan appointed Mark Fowler to chair the FCC;4 Fowler in turn set out to
deregulate the broadcasting industry. Under his leadership, the
FCC abandoned much of its reliance on rules governing every aspect of broadcast ownership and operation.
Largely as a result of Fowler's efforts, the FCC currently views
efficiency and broadcaster discretion as the best ways to serve the
t A.B. 1988, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Chicago.
1 44 Stat 1162, codified at 47 USC § 81 et seq (1927), repealed by § 602(a) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat 1064, 1102, codified at 47 USC § 602(a) (1988).
2 48 Stat 1064, codified at 47 USC § 151 et seq (1988) ("the Act").
S 47 USC § 303 (1988).
4 President Reagan nominated Fowler as Chairman in early 1981. Fowler remained
Chairman until 1987. FCC ChairmanSigning Off, 112 Broadcasting 75 (1987).
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public interest.5 While the FCC has not abandoned all regulation,
it has comprehensively reviewed its policies, and altered many to
better serve efficiency or to increase broadcaster discretion.6 Nevertheless, the FCC has yet to apply its policies of deregulation or
accommodation to two salient aspects of radio and television station financing: its prohibition of security interests in the broadcast
license, and its lengthy procedure governing foreclosure. In February 1991, commercial banks and the National Association of
Broadcasters asked the FCC to reconsider the prohibition of security interests in the broadcast license. This Comment focuses on
those finance regulations.
Section I explains the FCC's deregulation and accommodation
policies. The FCC has stressed its belief that fostering competition
in ownership and giving station owners discretion over operations
best serves the public interest. In addition, the FCC has long favored accommodating outside laws such as the Bankruptcy Code
and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). To better serve these
general policies, Section II advocates specific changes in the FCC's
security interest and foreclosure policies. The first part of the section argues that the FCC should allow creditors to take a security
interest in the license as well as in the tangible assets of a broadcast station for two reasons. First, allowing security interests in
broadcast licenses best suits the FCC's policy of efficient regulation. Second, it promotes the FCC's longstanding policy of accommodating state and federal laws, since the UCC recognizes security
interests in intangible assets like broadcast licenses. The second
part of Section II argues that the FCC should adopt the expedited
procedure it currently uses only in bankruptcy proceedings, the
"two-tier" transfer of control, for foreclosures outside of bankruptcy as well. Adopting this proposal would create more efficient
regulation by lowering the station owner's cost of financing. It
would also bring FCC policy into line with the policies underlying
the Bankruptcy Code by eliminating incentives to force debtors
into bankruptcy prematurely. Changes in these rules and procedures would bring financing policies in line with the FCC's otherwise pervasive attempts to deregulate the broadcasting industry
and would ultimately also benefit the broadcaster and the public
interest.

5

See, for example, In re Deregulationof Radio, 84 FCC2d 968, 971 (1981).
See discussion of policies reviewed and altered in text accompanying notes 25-63.
7 Banks Press for Right to Use Licenses of Broadcast Firms as Security for Loans,
Wall St J A4 (May 9, 1991).
6
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I. FCC POLICIES
The FCC's policies of efficient regulation and accommodation
pervade many aspects of its regulation. The FCC sees efficient regulation as the way to ensure that broadcasters best serve the public
interest. The FCC also takes the accommodation principle seriously, altering longstanding procedures when necessary in order to
avoid conflicts with state and federal laws.' This section explains
these policies and the value the FCC places on them.
A. Deregulation
Over the past ten years, the FCC has come to a new understanding of the broadcasting industry. Chairman Mark Fowler arrived at the FCC in 1981 with a new agenda: deregulation. Under
his direction, the FCC began relying on market forces-focusing on
efficient operations and licensee programming discretion as the
best ways to serve the public interest." This new philosophy created a framework for an ongoing process of removing many existing ownership and operations regulations. This Comment-argues
that it also provides standards for reviewing broadcast finance regulations and procedures that have thus far evaded the FCC's
scrutiny.10
1.

Theory behind the FCC's actions.

In their seminal article, Chairman Mark Fowler and Legal Advisor Dan Brenner advocated deregulation of commercial radio and
television. 1 The authors argued that the FCC can best serve the
public by allowing broadcasters to respond to public demand. The
Commissioners reasoned that the historic justifications for regulation do not withstand close scrutiny. Scarcity, the primary justification for regulation, 2 had given way to abundance. In 1934, when
the FCC was created, there were fewer than 900 radio stations and
8 See discussion in In re Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, 59 Red Reg2d 1536, 1554
(1986).
1 See discussion of these policies at text accompanying notes 25-63.
10 This Comment argues that altering regulations in the area of broadcast financing
would be consistent with the FCC's decision that deregulation is appropriate and beneficial.
Analyzing the merits of deregulation is beyond the scope of this Comment. For criticisms of

the FCC's deregulation policy, see William W. Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First
Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 SC L Rev 539, 562 (1978).
n Mark S. Fowler and Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Deregulation,
60 Tex L Rev 207, 209-10 (1982).
12 Id at 221.
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no television stations."3 As of May 1, 1985, there were 4,785 AM
radio stations, 3,771 commercial FM radio stations, and 907 commercial television stations. 14 In addition, cable television, low
power television, subscription television and broadcast satellites
have greatly increased the number of alternative outlets. 15
Moreover, as Ronald Coase first pointed out in the context of
broadcasting licenses in 1959,16 all resources are scarce. Ideally, a
market-based system uses prices to ensure that scarce resources go
to those who will make the best use of them. 17 Thus, Fowler and
Brenner argued that scarcity had never justified regulation. Many
courts and the FCC eventually rejected the scarcity rationale,'
thereby removing the FCC's primary justification for regulation.
In addition to criticizing the historical reasons for extensive
regulation, Commissioner Fowler and other advocates of deregulation have cited several advantages to moving toward a free market
in broadcasting. Most importantly, Fowler contended that broadcasters are best able to serve the public's true interest. 19 The FCC
had created the regulations without actually providing the service,
or, as Fowler explained it, the FCC had second-guessed the business judgment of risk-taking and innovative entrepreneurs. 20 Instead, Fowler argued, recognizing the broadcaster's expertise in
running a station efficiently and serving the public interest effectively would best accomplish the FCC's mandate. 2 1 He also argued
that regulation limiting broadcaster control inhibits innovation
and technological development, because broadcasters who do not
completely control their positions on the spectrum have fewer in11 American Enterprise Institute Legislative Analysis, Broadcast Deregulation 2-3
(AEI, 1985) (an analysis of current proposals before Congress, prepared by the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research with the help of specialists in law, economics, and government).
14 Id.
15 Id.
1I Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J L & Econ 1, 14
(1959).
Fowler and Brenner, 60 Tex L Rev at 221 (cited in note 11).
18 Syracuse Peace Council v WTVH TV, 2 FCC Rec 5043, 5054-55 (1987) ("[I]n analyzing the appropriate First Amendment standard to be applied to the electronic press, the
concept of scarcity-be it spectrum or numerical-is irrelevant."), aft'd, Syracuse Peace
Council v FCC, 867 F2d 654 (DC Cir 1989) (FCC's abolition of the fairness doctrine not
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion). See also In re Deregulation of Radio, 84
FCC2d at 1027-29.
2' Mark S. Fowler, Foreword, 32 Cath U L Rev 523, 524-26 (1983).
20 Id at 527.
21 Id at 527-28. For an example of inefficient second-guessing, see discussion of the
FCC's justifications for eliminating the "three year" rule at notes 29-33.
27
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centives to learn how to maximize value per unit.22 In addition,
many commentators argued that content regulation violated
broadcasters' First Amendment rights.23
Fowler believed that the FCC must be willing to self-destruct
to the extent necessary to achieve the shift to the marketplace.24
However, he and the Commission adopted the more practical approach of dissolving the FCC's control over station owners through
an evolutionary process of "unregulation." By unregulation be
meant that the FCC would scrutinize every regulation, and eliminate those that did not further the public interest. 2 As will be
shown below, however, the FCC has yet to scrutinize regulations in
two key areas of broadcast financing.
2. The FCC's actions.
The FCC has taken substantial steps toward deregulation in
both station ownership and operation. On the ownership side, the
FCC has eliminated so-called "trafficking" rules that limited alienation of licenses.26 It also relaxed multiple ownership restrictions.
On the operations side, the FCC eliminated all content restrictions,
Fowler, 32 Cath U L Rev at 523, 527 (cited in note 19); Comment, A "Better"Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 36 Fed Corn L J 27, 32 (1984). Some argue
that complete deregulation, and the resulting ownership of a place on the spectrum, would
be the best way to create these benefits. Allowing broadcasters to own and freely trade in
the spectrum is an argument beyond the scope of this Comment. For discussion of possible
property rights systems, see Fowler and Brenner, 60 Tex L Rev at 242 (cited in note 11);
Jora R. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation:An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J L & Econ 221 (1975).
23 See, for example, Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionalityof Licensing Broadcasters, 64 NYU L Rev 990 (1989) (arguing that broadcast regulations violate the First Amendment and advocating removal of virtually all restrictions). The FCC has eliminated several
regulations based in part on its concern that the regulations violated the First Amendment.
See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rec at 5047-52 (eliminating fairness doctrine), and In
re the Revision of Programming and CommercializationPolicies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 FCC2d
1076, 1089 (1984) ("In re the Revision of Programmingand CommercializationPolicies")
(deregulating several aspects of television content regulation). The changes proposed by this
Comment do not affect content regulation and thus pose no First Amendment problem.
24 Mark S. Fowler, The Public'sInterest, 4 Corn & L 51, 55 (Winter 1982).
21 Fowler, 32 Cath U L Rev at 579 (cited in note 19), citing Fowler, Broadcast Unregulation in the 1980's, Television Q at 29-30 (Spring 1982).
26 In re Amendment of Section 73.3597 of the Commission's Rules (Applications for
Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control), 55 Rad Reg2d 1081 (1982) ("Applications
for Voluntary Assignments").
27 In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules, the BroadcastMultiple Ownership Rules, 4 FCC Rec 1741 (1988) ("Multiple Ownership Rules").
2'
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including guidelines for commercials and non-entertainment programming as well as methods for ascertaining community needs. 8
a) Removal of restraintson alienation.In 1982, the FCC
abolished the "three-year" rule, which required a hearing for any
attempted assignment or transfer of a broadcasting license where
the current holder had operated with the license for less than three
years. 29 The FCC had adopted the three-year rule in 1962, reasoning that an individual who purchased a station for profit would
place earning money above serving the public interest.30 In its reversal twentyyears later, the FCC explained that profit and service
are not mutually exclusive.3 1 The FCC now reasons that, in today's
competitive marketplace, a three-year holding requirement would
prevent the license from going to its "higher valued use. '3 2 A holding period requires broadcasters to operate stations they no longer
want or are unable to operate successfully while preventing willing
and able buyers from taking over operations. Because stations that
serve best will profit most, the FCC reasons, broadcasters will buy
unprofitable stations not serving the public, improve their performance, and increase profits.33
The FCC even believes that speculation in broadcast stations
serves the public interest. It recognizes that in broadcasting, as in
any other business, "people who trade in broadcast properties, rehabilitate ailing stations with new capital and ideas or relieve unwilling licensees of the responsibility of running a station they no
longer want" perform important services.34 In short, the FCC believes that relying on market forces and allowing broadcasters to
decide when to sell their stations best serves the public interest.
b) Relaxation of multiple-ownership restrictions. The
FCC's trust in a competitive market and in operating efficiency
In re Deregulationof Radio, 84 FCC2d 968, In re the Revision of Programmingand
CommercializationPolicies, 98 FCC2d 1076.
29 Applications for Voluntary Assignments, 52 Rad Reg2d at 1082.
30 Id, citing Applications for Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control, 32 FCC
689 (1962).
28

31

Id at 1082.

Id at 1087. The FCC cites changes in the broadcasting industry as a justification for
the change in policy. Id at 1086. Since 1962, when the FCC instituted the three year rule,
the number of on-air radio stations increased from 3,712 to 9,125 and television stations
increased from 603 to 1,059. Id. In addition, households receive more stations and have
available new technology such as cable and video recordings. Id at 1087.
22

33
3

Id.
Id at 1088.
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also underlies its decision to relax multiple ownership (or crossownership) restrictions.3 5 In 1989, the FCC amended the "one-to-amarket" rule that prohibited a party from owning a radio station
and a television station in the same market.3 These amendments
create a waiver policy for proposed radio-television combinations
provided certain conditions are met. For example, the FCC will
look favorably upon waiver applications for multiple ownership in
markets where there will be at least thirty individual licensees after allowing the combination, and in situations involving "failed
37
stations.
The FCC based its decision to relax restrictions on multiple
ownership on the increased competition that has accompanied the
growth in the total number of stations as well as on the economic
efficiencies, and service and programming benefits the modification
would create. The FCC explained that relaxing the cross-ownership rules would not significantly decrease the diversity of viewpoints represented, reasoning that the huge increase in the number
of outlets over the past twenty years would diffuse the potential
impact of allowing any one broadcaster to own two licenses in the
same area. 8 Moreover, the comments of current television licensees suggest that station owners do not necessarily adopt the same
viewpoint for each of their stations.39 Thus, the FCC concluded
that allowing more cross-ownership would not significantly affect
40
viewpoint diversity.
3 Multiple Ownership Rules, 4 FCC Rec 1741.
,6Id at 1742. The Commission adopted the "one-to-a-market" rule in the early 1970s.
See In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard,FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 FCC2d
306 (1970) (restricted to owning one AM-FM pair or one television station); In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission'sRules Relating to Multiple
Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 FCC2d 1046 (1975)
(cannot own station and a newspaper).
Multiple Ownership Rules, 4 FCC Rec at 1750. The "failed station" criterion allows
multiple ownership when a station has not operated for a significant amount of time or
when one is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding and would not be able to operate without
the waiver. Id at 1752.
3 Id at 1743-44.
3 For example, CBS stated that "in 45% of the instances in which CBS-owned television and radio stations in the same market made endorsements in electoral races from 19801983, they endorsed opposing candidates." Id at 1744. Similarly, NBC stated that, even
among its stations located in the same market, editorial and programming decisions are
made independently from other NBC-owned stations, resulting in different editorial and
programming decisions between stations. Id.
40 The FCC had also originally intended the prohibition of cross-ownership to foster
competition among broadcasters. Id at 1742. But in its 1988 decision, the FCC concluded
that the increased number of stations in each area had decreased the potential for anticompetitive results from relaxing the rules. Id at 1746.
3,
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The FCC argued not only that the original justifications for
restrictions on multiple ownership had faded, but also that a relaxation of the rules would bring significant benefits. Specifically, the
FCC found that joint ownership often brings significant cost savings resulting from economies of scale. 4 1 It believed that such savings to licensees might ultimately create programming benefits in
the form of more news, public affairs, and other non-entertainment
programming. A National Association of Broadcasters study reported that group-owned stations spent a larger percentage of their
budgets on this non-entertainment programming than did independent, stand-alone stations. 42 In addition, group-owned stations
aired more non-entertainment programming than did stand-alone
stations.4 3
c) Elimination of content regulations.Although deregulation of ownership was substantial, these changes pale in comparison to the deregulation of operations. Content regulations governing commercials and programming have virtually disappeared
for radio and television broadcasters. The FCC justifies this sweeping liberalization by focusing on the benefits produced by giving
broadcasters discretion to respond to market forces.
In 1979, the FCC began an inquiry into whether the enormous
growth in the broadcast industry had rendered its content regulations of radio obsolete. 44 The Commission concluded that the increase in the number of broadcast outlets had forced broadcasters
to target specific audiences in order to compete. According to the
FCC, this change in the broadcasting environment justified the
elimination of content guidelines in four major areas: non-entertainment programming, commercialization, ascertainment, and
program logs.4 5
With respect to non-entertainment programming, the Commissioners believed that market forces would ensure continued
support for non-entertainment programming that satisfied viewer
preferences. The FCC wanted to give broadcasters "maximum flexibility to be responsive to issues important to their listeners" with
a minimum amount of governmental interference." 46 An FCC re41 Id.
42 Id at 1748.
43 Id.

44 In re Deregulationof Radio, 84 FCC2d 968.
45 Id at 969-70.
46Id at 978.
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port stressed the Commissioners' belief that deferring to broadcasters' "good faith discretion" in setting the level of non-en47
tertainment programming would best serve the public interest.
The FCC relied on similar reasoning in eliminating the requirement of a formal hearing for any application that proposed to
air more than eighteen commercial minutes per hour of programming.4 The FCC reasoned that advertisers, audiences and station
owners created a "self-regulating system," thus making FCC regulation appear unnecessarily burdensome. Eliminating the hearing
requirement would also increase broadcasters' commercial flexibility and provide audiences with a greater diversity of commercials
for consumer products.4 9
Critics raised two significant arguments against deregulation
of programming content. First, several commentators feared that
station owners would reduce or eliminate non-entertainment programming once the FCC removed its guidelines.5 The FCC disagreed. It argued that since the amount of non-entertainment programming actually provided far exceeded the FCC guidelines, the
guidelines did not significantly affect the amount of time broadcasters devoted to non-entertainment programming. 5 1 In addition,
the FCC noted that radio stations devoted the most time to informational programming during the morning and afternoon rush
hours-the hours that draw the most listeners and the most advertisers.2 Stations also spent significant amounts of money on live
reports and other expensive news-gathering techniques not required by FCC guidelines.53 The FCC reasoned from these examples that public demand would ensure continued non-entertainment programming."
Second, commentators expressed concern that stations operating in a deregulated environment would reduce or eliminate pro-

47

Id at 983.

Id at 1000, citing FCC Rules § 0.281, 47 CFR § 0.281 (1990).
Id at 1004-06.
" Id at 1056-57, citing comments by the American Federation of State, City, and Municipal Employees and the U.S. Catholic Conference.
51Id at 1057-58, citing studies by the National Association of Broadcasters and the
Diocese of Cleveland.
52 Id at 1058.
53 Id at 1064.
4
49

- Id at 1058-59, 1062-63. The FCC did admit that listeners do not seem to demand
public affairs programming. Id at 1064. However, the report cited data showing that as market size increased so did public affairs programming. Id at 1065. The FCC reasoned that a
small audience does exist for such programming and that some broadcasters could be expected to respond to this demand if other broadcasters cut back. Id.
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gramming directed toward low income and minority groups. 55 The
FCC responded by explaining that its policies encouraging minority ownership of stations would ensure the continued availability of
programming responsive to minority interests. 6 In addition, the
FCC pointed to evidence that the diversity of expressed viewpoints
and the types of programming formats increased as the number of
stations increased. As competition increased, stations had to appeal to smaller and smaller segments of the community to find a
listening audience not already tapped by another station.5 7 Finally,
the FCC reasoned that since minorities were becoming an increasingly attractive audience for advertisers, station owners would provide programming aimed at minorities irrespective of FCC
guidelines.5 s
In addition to these specific criticisms, several commentators
argued that the FCC was abandoning the statutory "public-interest" approach with a marketplace approach.59 The FCC disagreed,
arguing instead that the public interest can be met through reliance on market forces in the radio market. The FCC construed the
public interest standard as providing the "maximum service to the
public at the lowest cost and with the least amount of regulation
and paperwork."6 0
The FCC followed deregulation of radio content with similar
deregulation of television content. In so doing, it emphasized the
"importance and viability of market incentives as a means of
achieving our regulatory objectives" and its belief that deregulation of programming content would "provide television broadcast-

55
56
57
58
59

Id at 1065, 1088-89.
Id at 1065.
Id at 1066.
Id at 1067.
Id at 974.
60 Id at 971. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Act as giving the FCC discretion
in deciding how best to serve the public interest. See, for example, FCC v NCCB, 436 US
775, 795 (1978), and NBC v United States, 319 US 190, 218 (1943). More specifically, the
courts have held that the FCC may allow market forces to operate if the FCC finds that the
free market will best serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. See, for example,
FCC v WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 US 582, 585-86 (1981) (upholding FCC's decision to
allow licensees to change their formats as they see fit instead of requiring FCC approval
over such changes); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v FCC, 707 F2d
1413, 1432 (DC Cir 1983) (upholding Report and Order on Deregulation of Radio); Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v FCC, 911 F2d 803, 810 (DC Cir 1990) (upholding FCC's decision to replace requirement that applicants submit detailed information
regarding proposed programming with a declaration that they will comply with their public

service obligations).
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ers with increased freedom and flexibility in meeting the continuously changing needs of their communities." 1
Finally, constitutional concerns led the FCC in 1987 to abandon the fairness doctrine, which had required broadcasters to cover
controversial issues and to give interested citizens a chance to present conflicting views.2
In summary, these changes in ownership and operations regulations reflect the FCC's belief that the marketplace best serves the
public interest. Giving broadcasters discretion over station operations and programming means stations will operate more efficiently. These efficiencies in turn may translate into programming
that is better tailored to listener demand."' The FCC currently
views reliance on market forces, the encouragement of licensee discretion and efficient operations as the best ways of serving the
6 4
public interest.

41

In re the Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 98 FCC2d at

1077.

"zIn In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerningthe GeneralFairness Doctrine Obligationsof Broadcast Licensees, 102 FCC2d
143, 190-92 (1985), the FCC expressed its belief that the fairness doctrine violated broadcasters' First Amendment rights by chilling speech and requiring the government to act as a
censor. The FCC formally abolished the doctrine in Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rec at
5057-58. For further discussion, see Mark A. Conrad, The Demise of the FairnessDoctrine:
A Blow for Citizen Access, 41 Fed Corn L J 161 (1989); John J. Hearn, The Demise of the
Fairness Doctrine, 56 Geo Wash L Rev 834 (1988).
63 The FCC's reliance on the marketplace and its decision to equate viewer preferences
with the public interest is extremely controversial. This Comment takes the FCC's decision
to deregulate as a given, and points out that its security interest and foreclosure policies are
inconsistent with its new philosophy. Thus, evaluating the merits of deregulation is beyond
the scope of this Comment. For critical evaluations, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein,
Preferences and Politics, 20 Phil & Pub Affairs 3, 28-29 (1991) (arguing that regulation, not
reliance on the marketplace and consumer preferences, best serves the public interest);
Comment, The FCC and AM Stereo: A DeregulatoryBreach of Duty, 133 U Pa L Rev 265,
266 (1984) (arguing that the "FCC's treatment of AM stereo is a paradigmatic example of
deregulation that is not in the public interest"); Comment, Deregulating Commercial Television: Will the Marketplace Watch Out for Children?, 34 Am U L Rev 141, 143 (1984)
(arguing that the "FCC's decision [to let the market operate instead of establishing] specific
regulations over children's programming violates its duty to serve the public interest and
does not represent reasoned decisionmaking"); Comment, Radio Deregulationand the Public Interest: Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission, 4 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 169 (1985) (arguing that deregulation of
radio will impede the ability of the public, prospective competitors, and the FCC to challenge a broadcaster's compliance with the public interest mandate).
In evaluating its regulations, the FCC has not always decided that deregulation best
serves the public interest. See, for example, In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to
Allow the Selection from Among Competing Applicants for New AM, FM and Television
Stations By Random Selection (Lottery), 5 FCC Rec 4002, 67 Rad Reg2d 1514 (1990) (deciding not to implement a random selection or lottery procedure to select among competing
applicants for new AM, FM, and television stations because of concern that reduction in
quality of broadcasting licensees and service would outweigh potential efficiency gains); Ap-
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B. Accommodation
While the FCC's deregulation policies focus on the relationship between the broadcast station owner and the FCC, the FCC's
accommodation policy focuses on the relationship between FCC
policies and state and federal laws. The FCC has a longstanding
policy of accommodating state and federal laws when it can do so
without infringing on its exclusive authority to make public interest determinations in licensing matters.6 5
For example, the FCC has altered its procedures concerning
the sale or assignment of broadcast licenses in order to accommodate federal bankruptcy law." Usually, the FCC will not approve
any assignment requested by an owner who cannot meet the FCC's
renewal qualifications.6 7 But in order to reconcile its policies with
federal bankruptcy policies, the FCC is less strict when a bankruptcy trustee requests an assignment. LaRose v FCC'8 indicates
how the FCC has made such an accommodation. In LaRose, the
FCC considered the bankruptcy trustee's request for assignment of
a license, even though the trustee represented a station owner who
could not have, made the same request in a non-bankruptcy setting.69 The District of Columbia Circuit required the Commission
to "approve the sale and assignment of the bankrupt's license
when the transaction will not unduly interfere with the FCC mandate to insure that broadcast licenses are used and transferred consistently with the Communications Act. '70 The FCC was to provide
plications for Voluntary Assignments, 55 Rad Reg2d at 1089-90 (reducing, but not eliminating, the holding period for permits to build a new station in order to "maintain the
integrity of the Commission's licensing processes and effectuate the intent of Sections 301
and 304 of the Act.").
" The FCC does refuse to accommodate federal or state law when it finds that it cannot defer without acting in derogation of its responsibilities under the Act. See, for example,
In re Merkley, 94 FCC2d 829, 839 (1983) (refusing to accommodate a state court's decision
to uphold a sales agreement that contained a prohibited reversionary interest).
" See, for example, In re Application of Second Thursday Corp., 22 FCC2d 515 (1970).
'7 Instead, the license reverts back to the FCC at the end of the station owner's term,
and the FCC assigns the license so that the owner receives none of the benefits from the
assignment.
494 F2d 1145 (DC Cir 1974).
19 Id at 1148. In this case, the D.C. Circuit found that the FCC had not followed its own
accommodation policy. The court ordered the FCC to consider the trustee's second request
for assignment even though it had rejected the first proposed assignment for failing to satisfy the FCC's requirements. The FCC's mistake on the facts in this case does not detract
from the general point that it should and does accommodate federal bankruptcy policy. The
case also shows the courts' willingness to force the FCC to accommodate federal policies
when it is feasible for the FCC to do so.
70 Id. See also In Re Fugazy Express Inc., 114 Bankr 865, 874 (S D NY 1990) (citing
LaRose with approval); In re Smith, 94 Bankr 220, 221 (M D Ga 1988) (same); In re Merk-
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this accommodation "in recognition of the public interest in protecting innocent creditors."7 1
In another context, the accommodation policy motivated the
FCC to change an entire set of regulations. In 1986, the FCC created an exception to its usual transfer-of-control application process for stations involved in tender offers. Section 310(d) of the
Communications Act requires FCC approval prior to any transfer
of control. Originally, anyone who wanted to use a tender offer to
take control of a broadcasting company would have to submit a
long-form transfer-of-control application. However, review of the
transfer-of-control application is a lengthy process that conflicts
with the federal securities policies against unwarranted regulatory
delay and governmental bias. 2 The FCC determined that in order
to accommodate federal securities laws regarding tender offers, it
would allow applicants to use an expedited process.
The FCC articulated four primary objectives in changing the
policy: complying with the Communications Act; avoiding unnecessary delay; ensuring FCC neutrality; and accommodating state and
federal policy.7 3 To resolve the conflict between these large potential delays and the policies of eliminating unwarranted regulatory
delay and of ensuring government neutrality, the FCC formulated
an alternative two-tier procedure that involved a grant of special

ley, 94 FCC2d 829, 837 (1983) (noting that purpose of this policy "is to permit trustees or
receivers to fulfill the obligations of their appointment [to dispose of the station's assets],
and, in some cases, to assure the continued operation of the licensed facility").
71 LaRose, 494 F2d at 1148.
7'In re Tender Offers, 59 Rad Reg2d at 1558-62. As the report explains, "Commission
consideration of the merits of the transfer under the long form process involves a myriad of
time-consuming steps." Id at 1550 n 66. First, interested parties have at least thirty days to
petition the FCC to deny the application. 47 USC § 309(d)(1) (1988). The applicant has ten
days after the petition has been filed to file its opposition to the petition, and the petitioner
then has five days to reply. 47 CFR §§ 1.45(a), 1.4(g) (1990). If either of the parties is served
by mail, the party has an additional three days added to the time to respond. 47 CFR
§ 1.4(h)(i) (1990). If no contested issues of fact remain when the parties have completed
these exchanges, the staff analyzes the record and makes a recommendation to the Commissioners. The Commissioners then render a decision.
However, if "substantial and material" questions of fact remain, the Act requires a
hearing before the Commission. 47 USC § 309(e) (Supp 1991). This entails a "potentially
time-consuming discovery process. . ., the direct testimony of witnesses and cross examination." In re Tender Offers, 59 Rad Reg2d at 1550 n 66. Certain issues arising during the
hearing may trigger an interlocutory appeal to the Review Board. 47 CFR § 1.301 (1990).
Once the Review Board rules and the hearing concludes, an administrative law judge renders a decision. The parties have a right to file exceptions with the Review Board within 30
days of public release of the judge's decision. After the Review Board proceedings conclude,
parties may file an application for review with the Commissioners. In re Tender Offers, 59
Rad Reg2d at 1550 n 66.
73 In re Tender Offers, 59 Rad Reg2d at 1539-40.
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temporary authority to a trustee while the FCC reviewed the longform application. 4
While the FCC considers the long-form application, the trustee has a limited ability to participate in the management and operations of the company. The trustee must safeguard the corporate
assets.75 He must "protect the buyer from unwarranted or imprudent actions by the existing Board of management, such as voting
themselves overly generous benefits or wasting corporate assets. 1 76
The trustee must also ensure continuity of broadcast operations.
He may replace officers, directors or employees who have either
resigned or who are not acting consistently with the trustee's
obligations.1
The FCC based its authority to implement this two-tier procedure on § 309(f) of the Communications Act.1 8 This section empowers the FCC to grant special temporary authority if it determines that "'extraordinary
circumstances exist requiring
temporary operations in public interest,' and [it] further determine(s) that 'delay in the institution ... of temporary operations
would seriously prejudice the public interest'. 1 9 The FCC reasoned that the need to accommodate federal securities policies
presents "an extraordinary circumstance which warrants the use of
special procedures." 80 Because § 309(f) gives the FCC authority to
postpone the requirement of the long-form application, creating an
exception to the usual procedure allowed the FCC to follow its
statutory mandate while accommodating federal securities policies.
The FCC felt accommodation was important enough to alter its
own policies.
These two policies, deregulation and accommodation, represent the FCC's framework for regulating in the public interest.
Although the FCC has implemented these policies in many areas of
ownership and operation, it has not implemented them in the area
of broadcast finance. The next section examines how the FCC's
prohibition on security interests and its procedures for foreclosure
frustrate its deregulation and accommodation policies. In each of
these areas, the Comment explains how changes in these finance

"IId at 1562-63. Section 309(f) of the Communications Act gives the FCC the ability to
grant special temporary authority.
'5In re Tender Offers, 59 Rad Reg2d at 1582.
76Id.
"7

Id at 1583.

78 47 USC § 309(f) (1988).

In re Tender Offers, 59 Rad Reg2d at 1569-70, citing 47 USC § 309(f) (1982).
'0 Id at 1570.
79
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regulations will benefit the FCC, the licensee, the creditors, and
the public.
II. FCC's

BROADCAST FINANCING POLICIES

In two areas of financing regulation, the FCC's current methods of furthering the public interest conflict with the efficiency and
accommodation policies described in Section I. First, the FCC
clings to an inefficient prohibition on security interests in licenses
that rests on justifications abandoned by the FCC in its recent deregulation of other areas. This prohibition is also inconsistent with
a provision of the Uniform Commercial Code that allows security
interests in intangibles, and thus frustrates the FCC's accommodation policy.
Similarly, the FCC's procedure for dealing with a creditor's
foreclosure on the assets of a station conflicts with its policy of
regulating efficiently. This policy not only creates incentives to
enter bankruptcy when it may not benefit all parties to do so, but
also violates an underlying tenet of the Bankruptcy Code by creating different substantive rights for creditors in bankruptcy. This
Section argues that these internal inconsistencies in FCC regulatory policy justify change.
A. FCC Prohibition on Security Interests in Broadcast Licenses
Broadcast stations operate in an active and competitive market, with about ten percent of all radio stations changing hands
each year.81 The value of a station in large part derives from the
ability to use a part of the spectrum, an intangible asset. The station's physical assets generally constitute a very small part of the
station's overall value. Notably, the higher the selling price of the
station is, the greater the percentage of intangible assets in the total station value. Specifically, the National Association of Broadcasters estimates that the intangible assets would represent onethird of the total value of a radio station sold for three hundred
thousand dollars, while they would represent two-thirds of the
value of a station sold for three million dollars.8 2 As these estimates show, the price of a station far exceeds the value of the station's tangible assets. Accordingly, potential purchasers who cannot finance the acquisition on their own must borrow far more
81 National Association of Broadcasters, Broadcast Lending: A Lender's Guide to the
Radio Industry 11 (NAB Radio, 1980).
as Id.
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money than the tangible assets are worth in order to buy the
station.
Lenders consider many factors when deciding to make a loan.
Security is high on the list of relevant factors.8 Lenders like to
hold collateral equal to or greater than the value of the loan. Of
course, most borrowers, like station owners, could not make any
money to repay the loan if the bank physically kept the business's
equipment as collateral. Article 9 of the UCC solves this problem
by allowing the creditor to take a security interest in the borrower's property. A security interest gives the lender two kinds of
rights. First, the lender gains property rights, meaning that under
certain circumstances the lender can repossess the property or go
to court to have the sheriff repossess and sell the property.8 4 The
lender also gains priority rights for collection on the property in
the event of a default. 5
Lenders that take security interests in a debtor's assets are
only protected up to the value of those assets. Thus, lenders that
use security interests want to be fully secured; that is, they want
the value of the assets in which they have security interests to
equal or exceed the amount of the loan. With broadcast station
lending, this would mean that a lender that provides a substantial
amount of the purchase price would want a security interest in the
intangible license as well as the station's tangible assets.
While the UCC permits security interests in intangible property such as licenses, the FCC does not. This increases the costs of
borrowing. Moreover, the FCC's refusal to recognize security interests in intangibles, in direct contrast to the UCC, conflicts with the
FCC's longstanding policy of accommodation. The following subsections explain how allowing creditors to take a security interest
in both the station's tangible and intangible assets would benefit
the FCC, the licensee, and the public.8 6
1.

The FCC's current position on security interests.

The FCC has held unequivocally that a broadcast license is
not subject to a lien.87 It has advanced two reasons for its position.
s' Id at 13.

UCC § 9-203 (ALI, 1987).

UCC §§ 9-301 and 9-312 (ALI, 1987).
8 The arguments in this Comment would support both the policies of allowing a security interest in the license alone and of requiring the lender to take a security interest in both
the tangible and the intangible assets. A discussion of the relative merits of those policies,
however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
'7 See, for example, In re Merkley, 94 FCC2d 829; In re Radio KDAN, Inc., 13 Rad
Reg2d 100 (1968); Stephens Industries, Inc. v McClung, 789 F2d 386 (6th Cir 1986).
85
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First, the FCC interprets several sections of the Communications
Act to mean that the license cannot be subject to "a reversionary
interest, a mortgage, a lien, a pledge or any other form of security.""8 The first such section is 47 USC § 301 (1988), which states
that the Act's purpose is "to provide for the use of [radio transmissions] channels, but not the ownership thereof..., by persons for
limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority .... ." The second is 47 USC § 304 (1988), which requires an
applicant for a license to have signed a "waiver of any claim to the
use of any particular frequency" based on previous use of the frequency. The third is 47 USC § 309(h) (1988), requiring a station
license to state that it "shall not vest in the licensee any right to
operate the station nor any right in the use of the frequencies designated by the license beyond the term" of the license. The final
provision is 47 USC § 310(d) (1988), which requires Commission
approval prior to the transfer, assignment or disposal of rights in a
construction permit or station license.
Since the licensee only uses the license subject to FCC control,
the Commission reasons that the licensee has no property right in
the license."" A licensee who does not own a license should not be
able to retain any right to regain his ownership if the new owner
defaults on a provision in the sales agreement. In addition, a reversionary interest or a security interest would limit the field of possible successors to the license.9 0
The second reason the FCC advances for its present position is
that it feared that encumbrances on a broadcast license would "endanger[] the independence of the licensee who is and should be at
all times responsible for and accountable to the Commission in the
exercise of the broadcasting trust."'" In short, the FCC fears that
allowing security interests would give creditors influence over station operations.92

8 In re Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting,92 FCC2d 849, 860 (1982), citing Churchill Tabernacle v FCC, 160 F2d 244
(DC Cir 1947) (respecting FCC's decision to prohibit security interests); In re The Yankee
Network, Inc., 13 FCC 1014 (1949); In re Radio KDAN, Inc., 13 Rad Reg2d 100; In re
Bonanza BroadcastingCorp., 11 Rad Reg2d 1072 (1967). Most recently, the FCC reiterated
its views in In re Omega Cellular Partners,5 FCC Rec 7624 (1990).
19 MG-TV BroadcastingCo. v FCC, 408 F2d 1257, 1264 n 21 (DC Cir 1968).
90 In re The Yankee Network, Inc., 13 FCC at 1020.
"1In re Radio KDAN, Inc., 13 Rad Reg2d at 102.
92 Evaluating whether the FCC's interpretation of the Act is the best interpretation or
even a plausible one is beyond the scope of this Comment. The Comment argues that
agency consistency (without any reference to outside policy or statutory construction argu-
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The conflict with the FCC's deregulation policy.

a) Licensee discretion.The FCC has abandoned its justifications for prohibiting security interests. In deregulating ownership and operations, the FCC increased broadcast station owner
discretion to better serve the public interest.. Giving discretion to
station owners to choose financing options supports recognition of
security interests rather than their prohibition.
Moreover, the FCC negates its voiced concern about creditor
control by accepting substitute means of creating security, like
stock pledge agreements coupled with negative pledge clauses.93
Lenders who rely on these types of security must monitor their
debtors more intensively than lenders who are fully secured. And
although lenders have no formal control or input into station operations, they often have increasing amounts of de facto control as
the licensee moves closer to default. Once the debtor breaches a
loan covenant, for example, the lender has the power to file a
transfer of control application and begin the process of taking control from the licensee. At this stage, negotiation often occurs and a
licensee who wants to keep her station has strong pressure to listen
to her lender's suggestions. Although the FCC prohibits such input
by third parties, it does occur.9 4 Thus, allowing any lending to
broadcast stations creates the evils the FCC cites as its justification for prohibiting security interests. Since security interest agreements can specify that the lender will not have any input into operations, allowing this method of financing does not create any
more lender control than current financing methods create.
The FCC's acceptance of stock pledge agreements also negates
any argument that the Communications Act itself prohibits security interests. In essence, the statutory provisions the FCC relied on
in banning security interests 5 state that a licensee only has the
rights given to it by the FCC. Since the FCC allows stock pledge
agreements, it must believe that these agreements do not violate
the Communications Act. Like a stock pledge, a security interest in
ments) requires changes in security interest and foreclosure policy. Thus, it starts with the
FCC's original interpretation of the Act, pointing out that the FCC has since abandoned its
own reasons for this interpretation.
"' See text accompanying notes 96-98 for discussion of proxies that lenders currently
use to get around the prohibition of security interests.
" Interview with Jeff Kilrea, Vice President of Greyhound Financial of Chicago, IL
(October 12, 1990) (notes on file with U Chi L Rev). Kilrea coordinates financing for advertising-driven media.
95 See text accompanying note 88.
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a license would be limited to the rights given to the licensee by the
FCC. A security interest does not expand the rights of a licensee or
a lender any more than does a stock pledge agreement. Thus, the
language of the Communications Act does not compel the FCC's
prohibition on security interests.
b) Efficiency. Substitute security arrangements such as
stock pledge agreements coupled with negative pledge clauses are
more costly to both lenders and broadcasters than are fully-secured loans. Efficiency therefore dictates that the FCC allow license holders to give security interests ina those licenses instead of
forcing them to use costlier mechanisms. The following paragraphs
explain why these substitute security agreements are inefficient
and costly.
Lenders combine two substitute security methods to achieve
the property and priority rights denied them by the FCC's prohibition of security interests in the intangible assets of a broadcasting
station. 6 Typically, in providing financing to a broadcasting station, a lender will take a security interest in the tangible assets and
a stock pledge agreement on all of the stock of the company. 7 The
security interest gives the lender priority and property rights to
the station's equipment. The stock pledge agreement gives the
creditor constructive custody or control of the station's stock as
security for the debt. If the debtor defaults, he must sign over
ownership of the stock to the lender, thus giving the lender control
over station operation upon default.
The lender often will also include negative covenants in the
loan agreement in an attempt to preserve priority. These negative
covenants restrict the debtor's ability to borrow in the future.
They may bar all future debt or they may require the debtor to
maintain a certain ratio between current earnings and fixed
charges. This latter type of clause has the effect of allowing trade
credit without allowing significant future financing. The creditor
can enforce the restrictive covenant by making its violation an act
of default. A negative covenant is a proxy for the priority rights
created by a security interest, since a lender which is the only one
96 Lenders can and do take security interests in the station's tangible assets to protect
their priority and property rights in those assets. However, as explained above, see notes 8182 and accompanying text, the tangible assets make up only a small fraction of the total
station value.
7 See Jack Whitley, A Primer on Commercial Transactions Under the Communications Act, 72 IlMBar J 26, 30 (Sep 1983).
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in line for the debtor's assets comes first in collecting on those
assets."'
These alternative financing methods currently used by lenders
provide inferior property and priority rights to those created by a
security interest. Because the tangible assets of a station constitute
only a small percentage of the station's value, having the right to
foreclose on these assets alone does not give a lender much comfort. So lenders take stock pledge agreements to gain control over a
station in default. However, a transfer of more than fifty percent of
the station's stock is considered a transfer of control, which requires the lender to file a long-form transfer of control application.
While the lender waits for FCC approval, it has no say in the station's operation and thus cannot protect the assets that provide its
source of repayment.9 9 Likewise, the negative pledge agreement
provides little protection to the creditor. While the clause resembles a security interest because it provides that no other creditor
can share in the debtor's assets, 10 0 courts have almost uniformly
held that a negative pledge agreement does not create a security
interest.101 Thus, if the courts will not enforce negative pledge
agreements,' 0 2 later lenders will share pro rata with the original
98

Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,18 J Legal Stud 209, 217 (1989).

09 See Section ll.B. for the argument that the FCC should change its foreclosure procedures to eliminate the inefficiencies created by the delay involved in a long form transfer of
control.
100Thomas C. Mitchell, The Negative Pledge Clause and The Classificationof Financing Devices, 60 Am Bankr L J 153, 156 (1986).
101 See, for example, In re Friese,28 Bankr 953 (D Conn 1983) (will not imply creation
of lien from a negative clause); Equitable Trust Co. v Imbesi, 287 Md 249, 412 A2d 96
(1980) (same); Manatee Federal Savings & Loan Association v Pace, 378 S2d 95 (Fla Ct
App 1979) (same); Palmeri v Allen, 30 Conn Supp 56, 299 A2d 552 (1972) (parties who want
to create security interest should use UCC form); Equitable Trust Co., 275 Md at 249, 412
A2d at 96 (same); Weaver v Tri City Credit Bureau, 27 Ariz App 640, 557 P2d 1072 (1976)
(negative pledge agreements could be used to take advantage of unsophisticated borrowers);
Browne v San Luis Obispo National Bank, 462 F2d 129 (9th Cir 1972) (same). In Coast
Bank v Minderhout, 61 Cal2d 3.11, 38 Cal Rptr 505, 392 P2d 265 (1964), the California
Supreme Court became the first and only court to find that a negative pledge agreement
gave the creditor a priority right. However, the court subsequently backed away from its
holding and subsequent lower court cases in California have come out both ways with similar facts. Compare Kaiser Industries v Taylor, 17 Cal App3d, 94 Cal Rptr 773 (1971) (finding security interest in agreement not to encumber or transfer), with Orange County Teachers Credit Union v Peppard,21 Cal App3d 448, 98 Cal Rptr 533 (1971) (refusing to find a
security interest in such an agreement). No other state court has followed the original California Supreme Court holding, and several have specifically declined to follow it. See
Weaver v Tri City Credit Bureau, 557 P2d at 1076 (calling court's reasoning "weak").
102 The lender therefore cannot stop the debtor from borrowing money from other creditors who lend money without knowledge of the pledge agreement. Schwartz, 18 J Legal
Stud at 210, 218 (cited in note 98). If the later lender knows of the negative pledge clause,
the original lender may be able to sue for inducing breach of contract, but such suits are
rarely filed since it is so difficult to prove inducement. Id at 210 n 5.
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lender if the debtor defaults."' 3 A creditor that must share in the
division of assets has a smaller chance of repayment than a creditor who has priority.
The inferiority of these alternative methods of securing loans
means that rational creditors which lend to broadcast stations will
charge the licensee more interest than they would charge if they
could ensure priority by taking a security interest directly.1 0 4 This
increased cost to the licensee conflicts with the FCC's new emphasis on efficient, least-cost regulation. Recognizing security interests
in the tangible and intangible assets of a station would result in
savings to the licensee, and allow her better to serve the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity."
3.

The conflict with the FCC's accommodation policy.

Allowing security interests in licenses would also better serve
the FCC's accommodation policy. The UCC generally recognizes
security interests in intangible property, which would include
broadcast licenses.1 05 The UCC also recognizes, however, that the
FCC policy prohibiting security interests trumps UCC policy. 10 6
But as the previous sections illustrate, the FCC's new emphasis on
broadcaster discretion and regulatory efficiency has cut away the
underlying justifications for its policy. In doing so, the FCC has
cleared the way for accommodation.
a) UCC treatment of security interests. Under Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code, parties may create a security interest in "personal property or fixtures" whenever it is their intent
to do so. 10 7 "Personal property or fixtures" is defined to include
"goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper
or accounts."'0 8 "General Intangibles," in turn, is defined to mean
"any personal property (including things in action) other than
103 Id.
I" See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale L J 857, 875 (1982). Professor Jackson makes the point that
lenders who know of increased risk of undercompensation if default occurs will charge the
debtor for this risk when making the loan. Although he is discussing secured credit, the
point applies equally well to lenders trying to create a security interest with a negative
pledge agreement.
105 UCC §§ 9-102(1)(a), 9-106 (ALI, 1987).
10 UCC § 9-104(a) (ALI, 1987).
107 Official Comment to UCC § 9-102(1)(a). Forty-nine states have incorporated some
part of the UCC into state law. Article 9 of the UCC has been adopted by forty-six states.
James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (West, 3d ed 1988).
108

UCC § 9-102(1)(a).
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goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and
money." 10 9 The Official Comment to Article 9 emphasizes the
broad scope of the definition, indicating that it includes "miscellaneous types of contractual rights and other personal property
which are used or may become customarily used as commercial
security." 110
Given the UCC's broad definition of "property," most courts
have recognized that creditors can take a security interest in a government license, notwithstanding the control retained by the government over final approval of any transfer of the license."' The
courts reason that the government's ability to withhold consent to
a transfer of a license does not negate the license's character as
transferable property of value, and therefore does not preclude the
attachment of a valid security interest in the license. For example,2
in Rainbo Express, Inc. v National Acceptance Co. of Chicago,"
the court upheld the validity of a chattel mortgage as against the
debtor's "operating rights" under a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The bankruptcy trustee had argued that the Certificate
represented a mere permit of a personal nature, emphasizing ICC
regulations that provided that no transfer of operating rights could
be effective without prior ICC approval." 3 The court responded
that the Certificate represented a property interest to which a lien
could attach. While the transfer of the operating rights was subject
to the contingency of governmental approval, the rights themselves
remained valuable in any event and were transferable once the
contingencies were satisfied. 1 4 Rainbo Express is but one example
of this construction of the UCC.
b) The conflict between the UCC and FCC policy. The
UCC and the courts recognize that the amenability of a governmental license to a security interest depends not only on transferability but also on the statute or regulation that creates the license
"'0 UCC § 9-106.
110 Official Comment to UCC § 9-106.
"I See, for example, In re O'Neill's Shannon Village, 750 F2d 679, 682 (8th Cir 1984)
(South Dakota liquor license); Bogus v American National Bank of Cheyenne, Wyoming,
401 F2d 458, 461 (11th Cir 1968) (Wyoming liquor license); First Pennsylvania Bank v
Wildwood Clam Co., Inc, 535 F Supp 266, 268 (E D Pa 1982) (Pennsylvania commercial
clamming license).
112179 F2d 1 (7th Cir 1950).
123 Id at 3.
211Id at 5.
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rights in the first instance. 11 5 The rationale underlying this rule is
that the UCC provides for the attachment and enforceability of
security interests with respect to "collateral," which is defined as
"the property subject to a security interest."" 6 Thus, when state or
federal law expressly provides that certain licenses created thereunder are not properly subject to security interests, courts have
held those licenses to be outside the scope of Article 9's definition
17

of property."

Since the Communications Act, as federal law, preempts the
UCC where the two conflict, any inconsistency between Article 9's
definition of "property" and the FCC's ban on the encumbrance of
broadcast licenses must be resolved in favor of the FCC."' The
courts that have considered the validity of a security interest taken
in an FCC broadcasting license have taken the FCC's pronouncements at face value and have held the security interest invalid." 9
However, as explained above, the FCC itself has abandoned its
reasons for prohibiting security interests. Since the FCC itself has
rejected the rationale underlying the conflicting rules, its policy of
accommodating state law supports changing them.
Allowing lenders to take a security interest in a station's tangible and intangible assets would reconcile this aspect of finance regulation with the FCC's general policies of deregulation and accommodation. The next section explains how these same arguments
I5

UCC § 9-104(a) states that Article 9 does not apply "to a security interest subject to

any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties
to and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property. . . ." Notably,
the UCC does not suggest that it is better for a federal agency to rely on the UCC rather
than to create its own scheme. Thus, one could argue that the FCC could accommodate the
UCC by creating its own scheme to fall within § 9-104(a). An analogy to the FCC's treatment of state contract rules may be helpful in understanding this point. State contract rules
(like the UCC) do not suggest that it is better for a federal agency to rely on those rules
rather than to bypass them by crafting specific contractual terms. Thus, the argument
would go, if the FCC creates its own contract rules it in fact "accommodates" state contract
law. The FCC, however, takes a broader view of accommodation: it rejected the analysis
described above, instead deferring to state contract rules. See In re Arecibo Radio Corp.,
101 FCC2d 545 (1985) (accepting state court judge's decision to remedy licensee's breach of
contract by reassigning license to previous licensee without FCC approval). By analogy then,
it is consistent to assume that the FCC's own views of accommodation would "require" it to
rely on UCC background rules, not merely to adopt its own scheme.
114 UCC § 9-105(1)(c) (ALL, 1987).
117 See, for example, 21 West Lancaster Corp. v Main Line Restaurant, Inc., 790 F2d
354 (3d Cir 1986) (holding that federal tax lien against Pennsylvania liquor license defeated
creditor's prior lien, since latter's security interest in the license never attached under state

law).
11sUCC § 9-104(a).
19 See, for example, Stephens Industries, 789 F2d 386.
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support changes in foreclosure policy, another aspect of finance
regulation.
B.

FCC Foreclosure Procedures

Creditors that lend to a broadcast licensee must comply with
FCC regulations when the licensee defaults. The FCC has one set
of procedures for licensees that default outside of bankruptcy and
another, shorter set of procedures for licensees that enter bankruptcy. The non-bankruptcy procedure involves a longer wait and
increased uncertainty than does the bankruptcy procedure. Since
creditors see time and risk as money, the long-form procedure used
outside of bankruptcy conflicts with the FCC's longstanding policy
of regulating stations at the cheapest cost to the licensee. In addition, having separate procedures inside and outside of bankruptcy
runs counter to the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and
creates distorted incentives that may damage the ability of all parties to recoup as much of their investment as possible upon default. Thus, extending the current bankruptcy procedure to all
cases involving licensee default would best serve the FCC's regulatory philosophy, federal bankruptcy policy, and the licensee's and
the creditors' interests.
1.

Current procedures.

A creditor of a broadcast station that gains the legal right to
foreclose on a station's assets or stock has two options: to foreclose
120
outside of bankruptcy or to force the debtor into bankruptcy. If
a creditor chooses the first option, it will enforce the stock pledge
agreement by demanding that the debtor endorse the pledged
stock to her.12 Upon endorsement, the creditor gains control over
the broadcast station's operations and can use this control to
recoup its investment.
Under FCC regulations this transfer of stock constitutes a
transfer of control. 2 2 Section 310(d) of the Communications Act
requires prior FCC approval for any such transfer, 123 so a creditor
120 See II.A above for a discussion of financing options creditors currently use when
lending to broadcast stations. These options give the creditor rights to the stock of the

company or to certain assets in the company upon default.

121 Of course this assumes that the station owner does not challenge the validity of the
negative pledge agreement, which the courts do not generally uphold. See text at notes 99-

103.
12 47 CFR
123 47 USC

§ 73.3555 (1990).
§ 310(d) (Supp 1991).
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that wishes to take control of the station's stock must file a longform transfer-of-control application and must submit to a thirtyday minimum public notice period. Moreover, FCC approval is itself a lengthy process. 2 4 In addition, the FCC may deny the application and assign the station to another interested party, giving
the creditor no control over the sale price and thus the amount of
money available to pay off the licensee's creditors. Further, the
creditor would have to wait until the FCC found a suitable assignee before receiving payment on the debt.
In contrast, the creditor can choose to force the debtor into
bankruptcy by filing an involuntary petition. 1 25 The debtor can either reorganize and make arrangements to pay off its creditors
under Chapter 11 or it can liquidate the business under Chapter
7.126 Chapter 7 liquidation mirrors foreclosure outside of bankruptcy since it involves selling the business and paying off the
creditors to the extent possible with the proceeds. Chapter 11
bankruptcy, by contrast, is very attractive to creditors.
The Communications Act, § 309(c)(2)(B), allows an exception
to the long-form transfer-of-control process for stations in bankruptcy. Under this provision, the FCC uses a two-tier procedure in
which the trustee, debtor in possession, or receiver appointed by
the court'2 7 files both a short-form and a long-form application.
The FCC reviews the short-form application on an expedited basis
to decide whether to grant temporary authority to operate the station. 2' The FCC then considers the long-form application prior to
allowing the sale of the station. 2 9 The benefit of the bankruptcy
procedure is that the trustee may participate in the management
and operations of the company while the FCC considers the longform application. The FCC analogized to § 309(c)(2)(B) and relied
on § 309(f) in implementing the two-tier procedures for transfers
of control in tender offers. For the reasons outlined below, this
124

The FCC does not keep statistics on the length of time it takes to complete a long-

form transfer of control application. However, as discussed above, see note 72, the statutory
requirements create a lengthy process.
"I5 Under 11 USC § 303(b)(2) (Supp 1991) of the Bankruptcy Code, one substantial
creditor may force a debtor with fewer than twelve creditors into bankruptcy.
"1 11 USC § 109 (Supp 1991).
127 See In re D. H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 94 FCC2d 117, 125 (1983) (no distinction
between trustee, debtor in possession and receiver for purposes of FCC procedures).
129 47 USC § 309(c)(2)(B)(1988). The FCC reviews the short-form application within
30-45 days. Telephone interview with Glen Greisman, Esq., Audio Services Division, FM
Branch of the FCC (Feb 27, 1991) (notes on file with U Chi L Rev).
M'In re Tender Offers, 59 Rad Reg2d at 1581 n 202. See text accompanying notes 7980 for discussion of the FCC's reliance on § 309(f) in the context of tender offers.
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Comment proposes that the FCC rely on § 309(f) to extend the
two-tier procedures to foreclosures outside of bankruptcy as well.
2.

The conflicts with the FCC's deregulation policy.

In addition to meeting the requirements of the Communications Act and allowing the FCC to accommodate bankruptcy laws,
the exception to the long-form transfer of control procedure used
in bankruptcy is an efficient means of dealing with creditors of a
station in financial distress. As this section will explain, expanding
this procedure to foreclosures outside of bankruptcy would further
the FCC's goal of regulating efficiently in order to best serve the
public interest. The long-form transfer of control process frustrates
the FCC's policy of efficient regulation by increasing the cost of
borrowing money. Naturally, the licensee must pay interest when
he borrows money. One of the primary determinants of the interest
rate a debtor pays is the riskiness of the loan. Basic economic theory instructs that lenders increase the rate of interest charged as
the chances of repayment decrease."" Since money received today
is worth more to a lender than the same amount of money received
tomorrow, the cost of borrowing increases as the time period over
" ' The long-form
which the lender expects to be repaid increases.13
transfer of control process both decreases the chances of repayment and increases the time the creditor must walt for that repayment. Moreover, while the FCC considers the long-form application the creditor cannot influence corporate decisions. Current
managers did not operate the station profitably before foreclosure,
and may be wasting the value of the license by operating inefficiently during the months of FCC review. 13 2 In addition, if the
FCC denies the application and finds its own assignee for the license, it does not have the incentives to search for a price that
would cover the amount of debt owed the creditor.
In contrast, the creditor of a station in bankruptcy can install
a trustee to watch over the corporate assets while the creditor
searches for an assignee for the station. The creditor knows with
certainty that she will be able to protect the assets available for
repayment and, through the trustee, ensure that a suitable as"' S. Charles Maurice, Owen R. Phillips, C.E. Ferguson, Economic Analysis (Richard
D. Irwin, 4th ed 1982).
131Id at 271-73.

132 A creditor can go to a court and ask for an injunction against the wasting of corporate assets, but this process takes time, costs money, and is not certain to succeed. Thus, the
uncertainty remains.
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signee is found. Although the assignee eventually will have to submit a long-form transfer-of-control application, the creditor will
control the time it takes to find such an assignee in the first place.
Hence she can make sure the application process begins quickly.
Increased control means more certainty of repayment as well
as a smaller time period before repayment. In turn, these effects of
the two-tier transfer of control process allow creditors to charge
lower interest rates. Paying less money to borrow money reduces
operations costs for the licensee. The FCC believes that licensees
with lower expenses will provide better broadcasting services. 133
Thus, implementing the two-tier procedure will allow the FCC better to serve the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."
Since the two-tier procedure is available to creditors that force
a licensee into bankruptcy, one could argue that creditors can rely
on this route to obtain the efficiencies created by this exception to
the long-form transfer of control procedure. However, as the next
section will show, creating different entitlements for creditors in
bankruptcy than for creditors outside of bankruptcy creates its
own inefficiencies.
3.

The conflict with the FCC's accommodation policy.

Treating foreclosure outside of bankruptcy differently than
foreclosure inside of bankruptcy conflicts with fundamental principles of the Bankruptcy Code. To create proper incentives, substantially similar policies must govern creditors' rights regardless of
whether the debtor is in bankruptcy. Thus, adopting the two-tier
approach for foreclosure outside of bankruptcy best suits the
FCC's accommodation policy.
a) Policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy law operates on the theory that when the debtor does not
have enough assets to go around, creditors that act as a group will
recoup more of their investment than creditors that act on their
own. 13 4 Imagine, for example, a printing business in which the
printing press is worth $100 and the plates are worth $50 if sold
separately. However, if sold together, a buyer would be willing to
pay $200 for the same press and plates. The additional $50 of
value results from the synergistic effects of the assets: the printing
company can only operate if it has both a press and plates.
'33
134

See text accompanying notes 41-43.
Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 10 (Harvard, 1986).

1450

The University of Chicago Law Review

[58:1423

If this business has one creditor, owed $200, he will sell the
press and plates together to maximize the selling price of the business. However, if the business has two creditors, each owed $100,
they may well act separately, with each creditor racing to foreclose
on the press to sell it for $100. Since each can keep no more than
$100, the individual creditor in this situation has no incentive to
get the entire $200 in value from a potential purchaser. Selling the
assets separately results in an aggregate $50 loss. In this situation,
if Creditor 2 loses the race to the press, it should foreclose on the
plates and bargain with Creditor 1 to sell both items to one buyer.
However, bargaining is costly. After all, Creditor 1 will recoup all
of its investment without dealing with Creditor 2. Since Creditor 2
benefits if it gets $1 over the $50 it would have gotten from selling
just the plates, the parties will negotiate ' over the $50 surplus. 135
Bankruptcy policy is designed to avoid these costly negotiations by providing procedures that ameliorate the "common pool"
problem described in the printing press example. 13 6 These procedures give a group of creditors incentives to function as a single
creditor. As one aspect of this policy, creditors can only force a
debtor into bankruptcy when it is in the collective interests of the
1
creditors as a group to do so. '3

Having different entitlements inside and outside of bankruptcy encourages creditors to force the debtor into bankruptcy in
order to obtain a benefit that would not otherwise be available to
them. 13 Imagine, for example, that the printing press business has
only one creditor. Here, no common pool problem exists, and the
creditor has incentives to maximize the value of the assets. But
assume also that this business has recently been forced to enter
into what the owner sees as unduly burdensome collective bargaining agreements. The creditor is unsure whether the business can
operate profitably if bound by these agreements. If, for some reason, bankruptcy policy allowed this business to abrogate its em135 A race to the assets is also costly because creditors will have to monitor all other

creditors to make sure no one is foreclosing on the assets.
1-6 For a discussion of bankruptcy as a common pool problem see Douglas G. Baird and
Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on Bankruptcy 39-43 (Little, Brown,
2d ed 1990), and sources cited therein.
137 Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law at 21 (cited in note 134).
138 Morris G. Shanker, The Abuse and Use of Federal Bankruptcy Power, 26 Case W
Res L Rev 3, 7 (1975). See also Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law at 21
(cited in note 134); and Jackson, 91 Yale L J at 904 (cited in note 104).
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ployment contracts inside of bankruptcy, the creditor would file an
involuntary petition to put the firm into bankruptcy. 3 '
The creditor would resort to bankruptcy not to solve the common pool problem for which the bankruptcy rules were created,
but to obtain a benefit it could not have obtained outside of bankruptcy. The same is true for a broadcast lender that can obtain
control of a station's assets faster by using the two-tier procedure
only available in bankruptcy.
In order to create proper incentives for creditors to use the
bankruptcy system for its designated purpose, a creditor's entitlements inside bankruptcy must not differ from those outside bankruptcy. The Supreme Court recognized this point in Butner v
United States,4 ° stating: "[u]niform treatment of property interests . . . serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.' "'
To prevent this
"windfall," the FCC should eliminate the incentive to force a creditor into bankruptcy currently created by the use of different
transfer of control procedures.
Creating different entitlements inside of bankruptcy also creates instability. Although creditors have incentives to enter bankruptcy instead of foreclosing outside of bankruptcy, smaller creditors cannot know with certainty at the time they lend money that
other creditors will in fact do so. These creditors will not know
whether they will have to operate under bankruptcy rules or nonbankruptcy rules if the debtor defaults. Uncertainty increases interest rates.' 4 2 As one scholar explained, "[s]uch uncertainty regarding the applicable law on which parties may rely is hardly a
situation which commends itself."'I4 3
b) The conflict with FCC procedures. As explained
above, the procedure used to transfer control to a station's creditor
in bankruptcy is more advantageous to the creditor than the procedure used outside of bankruptcy. Creditors have incentives to force
the licensee into bankruptcy so they can gain the increased certainty and control provided by the short-form/long-form procedure. These creditors use bankruptcy to gain substantive rights
131 This example is based loosely on In re Tinti Construction Co., Inc., 29 Bankr 971 (E
D Wis 1983).
140 440 US 48 (1979).
141 Id at 55, citing Lewis v Manufacturers Nat. Bank, 364 US 603, 609 (1961).
11 See Section ll.B.2.
143 Shanker, 26 Case W Res L Rev at 8 (cited in note 138). See also Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L Rev 953, 957 (1981).
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that they could not get by foreclosing outside of bankruptcy. These
incentives hinder the collectivization function that underlies bankruptcy policy. Because creditors who know they will have access to
the expedited transfer of control procedure upon default in bankruptcy charge less interest, it would make sense for the FCC to
implement this procedure for default outside of bankruptcy.
As with security interests, then, deregulation and accommodation policies support changes in foreclosure procedures. Extending
the two-tier transfer-of-control procedure outside of bankruptcy
increases efficiency by decreasing the cost of borrowing. It would
also make FCC policy consistent with bankruptcy policy by ensuring equal substantive rights for creditors of all debtors in default.
Since the FCC sees deregulation and accommodation as the best
ways to serve the public interest, its own policies justify these
changes.
CONCLUSION

The FCC has done an admirable job of implementing its
change in philosophy on how best to serve the public interest. Unfortunately, the Commissioners did not scrutinize broadcast financing regulations when they scrutinized the other FCC regulations for inefficiencies. Nor did they accommodate federal policies
that affect broadcast finance. Recognizing security interests in licenses best suits the FCC's policies of favoring efficient regulation
and accommodation of federal law. Giving all creditors access to
the two-tier transfer of control process ensures efficient regulation
and creates proper incentives for lenders. Broadcast financing
should be the next step in the FCC's deregulation process.

